The three wars waged between the maritime city-state of Carthage and the militaristic Roman Republic spanned well over a century (264-146 B.C.E.), with casualties exceeding a million and destruction unparalleled in the Ancient world. Their outcome decided the future of the Mediterranean world, with echoes and repercussions that still reverberate today.
Both Carthage and Rome had been influenced by Hellenistic civilization, but who was to become the model for the centuries to follow? The merchant metropolis, whose hegemony was largely commercial, and who did not attempt to impose its laws, beliefs, or culture on others, or the expansionistic Roman empire, conquering and ruling with an iron hand those it regarded as destined to obey? Which would become the preferred method of conflict resolution, compromise and negotiation, or invasion and war, where might makes right?
The most important of the Carthago-Romano wars was the second one (218-201 B.C.E.), in which the brilliant Carthaginian general, Hannibal, took an army (including 37 elephants) across the Alps, to attack the Romans on their own land. He arrived in the north of Italy with a mere 20,000 infantry and 6,000 horse, was joined by Gallic warriors, and defeated the legions of Rome in battle after battle (including the one at Cannae, where he annihilated the largest army Rome had ever assembled).
For 16 years he remained undefeated in Italy but failed to get the necessary reinforcements to force the war to a conclusion, and eventually was recalled to defend Carthage against the Roman invasion of North Africa. There, deprived of his cavalry, he suffered defeat at Zama. Hannibal has been called the last hero of the free world of Antiquity—after the failure of his gallant struggle nothing could stand in the way of the predatory might of Rome.
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596
(10 votes, average 5.00 out of 5)
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Written by Yozan Mosig
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Wednesday, 17 March 2010 |
Capua, the second largest city in the Italian peninsula, had grown weary of the Roman yoke, and in 216 BCE, following Hannibal’s crushing defeat, at Cannae, of the largest Roman army ever assembled, opened its doors and welcomed him as liberator. This was an important defection from the Roman alliance and a clear indication that his plan to separate Rome from its subjects and allies appeared to be working. Hannibal and his army established winter quarters at Capua that year, an event that became a cause celebre for classical historians Appian and Livy, who claimed that wintering among the comforts offered by the city destroyed the moral fiber of the Carthaginian army, to the point that they were unable to win any further victories. They supposedly found the climate, the food, the women, the hot baths, and the entertainment so alluring that they lost their discipline and their battle readiness, growing fat and lazy. This well-known contention has entered popular literature to the point that, as Guerber points out, “when people think too much of ease and not enough of duty, they are said to be ‘languishing in the delights of Capua’.” Is there any truth to this story, or is it merely another example of Roman patriotic propaganda?
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560
(10 votes, average 5.00 out of 5)
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Written by Yozan Mosig
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Thursday, 18 February 2010 |
Hannibal is often criticized for not marching on Rome immediately after his crushing victory at Cannae in 216 BCE, over the largest Roman army ever assembled. Even Montgomery, who should have known better, condemns Hannibal in his History of Warfare for this apparent failure, arguing that it cost him the war. But was this indeed a strategic error on the part of the brilliant Carthaginian commander?
In an often-quoted anecdote, reported in the account of the war between Rome and Carthage by Livy (a notorious patriotic Roman propagandist), the commander of the Numidian cavalry, Maharbal, supposedly urges Hannibal in vain to march without delay against Rome, telling him: “In five days you shall banquet in the Capitol! Follow after; I will precede you with the cavalry that the Romans may know that you are there before they know that you are coming!” Upon Hannibal’s refusal, he allegedly rebukes him by saying: “In very truth the gods bestow not on the same man all their gifts; you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal: you know not how to use one” (Livy 22:51). As Seibert has pointed out (1993, p.199), this incident is clearly a Roman fabrication, as shown by the reference to “banqueting in the Capitol,” for Maharbal could hardly have known that this was customary for a returning victorious Roman general! Livy presents this bit of nonsense to bolster his own thesis: “That day’s delay is generally believed to have saved the City and the empire” (22:51). Uncritical readings of Livy have led to the widespread assumption that Hannibal experienced a lapse of judgment with catastrophic consequences by not descending upon Rome in the aftermath of Cannae. Do the facts support such verdict?
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468
(14 votes, average 5.00 out of 5)
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Written by Yozan Mosig
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Tuesday, 10 November 2009 |
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It is morning, August 2, 216 BCE. Hannibal is on horseback on a slight acclivity, casting his gaze over the plain of Cannae, together with his brother Mago and a small group of officers. The Roman army under consuls Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Caius Terentius Varro is deploying for battle. It is the largest Roman army ever assembled, eight Roman and eight allied legions, 16 legions total, and there are Romans filling the horizon as far as the eye can see—the front is over a mile wide. Gisco, one of the officers, whispers, “Hannibal, there are a lot of Romans there!” The Carthaginian commander replies, “Yes, Gisco, but you don’t seem to have noticed a very important thing.” “What, my general?” “Among all those Romans, there isn’t a single one named Gisco!” Hannibal could have added “and among them there is also no Hannibal”.
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455
(18 votes, average 4.72 out of 5)
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Written by Yozan Mosig
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Tuesday, 03 November 2009 |
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One of the problems that emerge from the description of the battle of Cannae (216 BCE) in the historical accounts provided by Polybius and Livy concerns the numerical strength of the Roman cavalry, a critical factor in understanding Hannibal’s tactical masterpiece.
Polybius lived from approximately 200 to 118 BCE, and wrote about Cannae 50 years after the battle. He may have interviewed survivors. A military man, he had experiential understanding of the battlefield, and his history is more reliable than that of Livy. Nevertheless, Polybius was employed by the Aemilian family and was friend and mentor of Scipio Aemilianus, the Roman general responsible for the genocidal destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE, an event Polybius witnessed. Because of this connection his objectivity is suspect in matters involving the family he served (Lucius Aemilius Paulus was in command of the Roman horse at Cannae).
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422
(14 votes, average 5.00 out of 5)
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Written by Yozan Mosig
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Friday, 09 October 2009 |
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Following his epic crossing of the Alps in 218 BCE, Hannibal arrived in Italy with a diminished army of 20,000 infantry, 6,000 horse, and presumably all 37 elephants (elephants are very sure-footed animals, unlike mules, horses, or people, and it is credible that they all survived the slippery and freezing ordeal, although all but one would later perish that winter from the cold). With this relatively small army (and whatever Gauls were willing to join him), Hannibal faced the might of Rome (with a man-power potential of over 700,000 soldiers).
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